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1. Overview 
This document constitutes a final reporting of findings for Task Order No. 4 
entitled "Blowout Resistant Tire Study for Commercial Vehicles," under the Accident 
Data Analysis Support project (DTRS57-97-C-0005 1). 
The report is organized by the following principal sections: (1) Overview, (2) 
Crash Data Analysis of Truck Tire Blowouts, (3) Information Review of Truck Tire 
Blowouts, (4) Blowout Resistant Tire Developments and Related Industry Contacts, and 
(5) Summary Observations. 
Section 2 contains analyses conducted by the UMTRI Center for National Truck 
Statistics that address findings regarding the crash record relating to heavy truck tire 
blowouts. Observations from the crash data analysis note the very small percentage of 
fatal crashes associated with truck tire failures overall, and the even smaller invol~~ement 
of tire blowouts in fatal crashes when the blowout occurs at a rearward location on the 
truck (non-steering axle cases). Crashes related to road debris (of which tire debris 
represents some unknown portion) are also addressed briefly in Section 2. A key 
observation from the crash data analysis is the significant linkage between fatalities 
involving truck tire blowouts and front tire (steering axle) involvement. A strong 
relationship between type of crash and left- versus right-side front axle blowouts is also 
noted. Left front blowouts are more frequently associated with multiple vehiclle fatal 
crashes, whereas right front blowouts are more associated with single-vehicle crashes. 
These observations are consistent with general expectations that left front blowouts 
produce a leftward path disturbance to the truck (potentially into oncoming or adjacent 
traffic), while right front blowouts produce rightward disturbances to the truck which are 
more likely to involve road departure incidents. 
Section 3 contains results and associated discussion of the literature review 
conducted by the UMTRI Engineering Research Division. In addition to a discussion of 
certain key studies of truck tire blowouts conducted previously by various agencies in the 
literature review, more current developments within the tire industry were pursued 
though industry contacts (as reported in Section 4) and through inquiries of currenit patent 
databases to supplement the technical literature review. 
Section 4 identifies various technologies relevant to blowout resistant tires as well 
as associated industry contacts. 
Lastly, Section 5 provides a summary of the key observations from each of these 
areas. 
All bracketed [ ] numbers within the text refer to the reference list near the: end of 
the report. 
[This page intentionally left blank.] 
2. Crash Data Analysis of Truck Tire Blowouts 
This section of the report describes the crash data analysis of heavy truck tire 
blowouts conducted by the UMTRI Center for National Truck Statistics. 
Available crash data files were surveyed for information on the incidence of truck 
tire blowout in crashes. The primary emphasis in the crash data analysis was on truck tire 
blowout as a direct crash causal factor. Note that blowouts that did not lead to loss of 
control and a crash will be missed. For this analysis, crash files surveyed included the 
Trucks Involved in Fatal Accidents (TIFA) file, which is based on the Fatality Analysis 
Reporting System (FARS); the nationally representative sample of police-reported 
crashes in the General Estimates System (GES) file; and state files from Michigan, North 
Carolina, Tex.as, and Washington, In general, tire blowout is not directly identified in 
most crash data files. At best, most data files indicate only whether a tire "defect" existed. 
Tire defects can include under-inflation, over-inflation, or insufficient tread, as well as an 
actual blowout. However, copies of the original police reports are available for the TIFA 
file, and all cases coded with tire defects over a three year period were reviewed to 
identify tire blowouts. In addition, the GES file includes a crash event variable which 
identifies tire blowout as a precipitating event. Both the manual case review of fatal tire 
defect crashes and the analysis of the GES data provided realistic estimates of the 
incidence of truck tire blowouts in crashes. Results from the analysis of each crash file 
are discussed separately below. 
A secondary effect of truck tire blowout is the debris from the disintegrating tire 
left behind on the roadway. Even if the blowout did not immediately lead to a crash, a 
secondary effect could be subsequent crashes caused by either striking or attempting to 
avoid striking the debris. Once again, no available crash files identify events at the 
required level of detail, but both FARS and GES include information on crashes related 
to avoiding objects in the road. Counts of such crashes provide an upper limit to the 
proportion of crashes related to truck tire and other types of roadway debris. 
Truck tire blowouts in FARS (Fatality Analysis Reporting System:) and 
TIFA (Trucks Involved in Fatal Accidents) 
The FARS file compiles data on all crashes involving a fatality. The University of 
Michigan Transportation Research Institute's (UMTRI) TIFA program subsets fatal truck 
involvements from the FARS file and provides an improved identification of medium and 
heavy trucks involved in a fatal crash. As part of the process of building the TIFA file, 
police reports are collected on every crash involving a medium or heavy truck; in the 
United States. The TIFA file consists of all variables from the FARS crash, vehicle, and 
person files, along with supplemental TIFA variables providing a detailed description of 
the truck. 
Tire blowouts are not identified directly in either the FARS variables describing 
the crash or vehicle, or the TIFA variables. However, a multiple-response variable 
included among the FARS variables identifies "vehicle-related factors," which essentially 
record vehicle defects present. The defects may or may not have contributed to th~e crash. 
Up to two vehicle defects may be recorded. One code available is for "tires." The "tire" 
code simply reports that a tire defect was present. Worn tires and any other tire defect is 
included here, in addition to tire blowouts. 
Table 2-1 tabulates the defects reported on all trucks involved in a fatal crash 
between 1995 and 1997. There were 14,768 total trucks involved in a fatal crash over that 
period. Of these, 129 or 0.87 percent of all trucks were reported with a tire defect.' Tire 
problems are the second leading defect noted. The most common vehicle defect was 
brake problems with 377 cases over the three years, 2.55 percent of all trucks involved in 
a fatal crash. Over 91 percent of the trucks were reported with no defects. It is likely that 
the number of defects is underestimated, since the reporting police officer is usually not 
trained to identify vehicle problems. Probably only the more obvious vehicle problems 
are recorded. However, a tire blowout likely falls into the category of vehicle defects that 
would typically be recorded. 
Police reports on all truck involvements are available as part of the TIFA 
program. Review of these reports, including the narrative, diagram, and any other 
information on the report, provides further information on the nature of the tire defect. 
Police reports on all cases in which a truck was coded with a tire defect for 1995 to 1997 
Table 2-1. Vehicle defects reported 
' Note that since up to two defects can be reported for each vehicle, the sum of the defects can be 
greater than the number of trucks. The total number reported in the table is the total of trucks involved in a 
fatal crash over the period, not the total of defects. Accordingly, the percentage calculation is the 
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were reviewed in an attempt to determine the incidence of tire blowout and to assess the 
results of the blowoul;. This amounted to 129 police-reported cases from 1995 to 19!37. 
As indicated in Table 2-2, only 52 (40.31 percent) of the 129 tire defect cases 
included a blowout, Wheel separation was noted in 12 cases, though these cases should 
not have been recorded as a tire defect because there is a "wheel" code avai1ab:le that 
should have been used. "Bald" or "slick" tires constituted the tire defect irr 45 cases. In 
eight cases, no tire-related problems were evident from the police report, either from the 
narrative, diagram, or any code for vehicle defect or crash event. In these cases, "tire 
defect" may have been coded in error. In the remaining 12 cases, there was no indication 
of a tire problem, nor any positive indication that there were no tire problems. 
Table 2-2. Review of FARSJTIFA 
cases with tire defects noted 
(TIFA 1995-1997) 
Thus, of the 14,768 trucks involved in a fatal crash, 1995-1997, 52 (0.35 percent) 





no tire problems 
unknown 
total 
crash, but in some, the blowout was incidental or even occurred significantly prior to the 
crash. The rate of truck tire blowouts in fatal truck crash involvements is 0.094 per billion 








miles. These rates are calculated using truck travel estimates from the Federal Highway 
Administration's Highway Statistics for 1995 through 1997. 
Fatal truck tire blowout crashes are more likely to be single-vehicle crashes, 
versus that of the overall record that includes all fatal truck crashes. Direct review of the 
police reports for the above 52 blowout crashes indicate that 23 (44.23 percent) were 
single vehicle crashes and 29 (55.77 percent) involved two or more vehicles. This 
compares with 17.06 percent of all fatal truck involvements from 1995 to 1997 were 
single vehicle crashes, while 82.94 percent involved two or more vehicles. 
As part of the review, the location of the blowout by axle and axle end was 
recorded, as well as whether vehicle control was maintained. Table 2-3 reports the results 
of this analysis. Most of the blown tires were on the front axle - 35 of the 52 tire 
blowouts. This probably reflects the fact that the crash data is restricted to fatal crashes. 
Steering axle blowouts typically lead to loss of control which may in turn cause ;a crash. 
On the front axle there were 22 blowouts on the left (62.86 percent of front axle 
blowouts), about twice as often as on the right, with 13 (37.14 percent). The 
preponderance of left side blowout may also reflect the severity bias of the crash file. A 
blowout to the left front tire typically leads to loss-of-control (LOC) to the left, which 
directs the truck into the oncoming traffic stream or adjacent traffic. Right-side bliowouts 
usually lead to LOC to the right and a single-vehicle crash, with a lower probability of a 
fatality in the crash. 
Twelve of the tire blowouts occurred either on drive axles or trailer axles. The 
blowout location could not be determined in five cases. Given that the truck lost control 
in known ways in three of the five cases, one to the right and two to the left, most likely 
one of them was a right front tire and two were left front. 
total 1 52 100.0 
Table 2-3. Blowout location 
(TIFA 1995-1997) 
Table 2-4 tabulates the result of the tire blowouts by the location of the tire. There 
is a strong and intelligible pattern. When the blowout occurred on a steering axle, the 



















Table 2-4, Reaction of the truck to tire blowout by location of tire blowout 
(TIFA 1995-1997) 







The single instance where control was not lost occurred on a city street. The truck 
was parked and repairs were being attempted when an approaching passenger vehicle lost 
control and struck the rear of the truck. In every other case where a steering axle tire 
failed, the driver lost control of his truck. When the left front tire blew, the truck typically 
veered to the left, most often into oncoming traffic. When the right front tire blew, the 
truck typically lost control to the right. Control was typically maintained after blowouts 
on drive or trailer axles. In three of the 12 cases, the truck continued at the same speed. In 
four cases, the truck slowed down after the blowout, but proceeded under control. In one 
case, the truck had stopped to repair the blowout at the time of the crash. In three cases of 
tire blowout location 









































drive or trailer axle blowouts, the truck did go out of control. In one case, the driver over- 
corrected following the blowout and left the roadway. In another, a tractor-semitrailer 
with a propane tanker was negotiating a high speed curve when an outside trailer axle tire 
blew. This caused the outside tire to lose its bead and deflate. Cargo shift pulled the 
combination over. In the final case, a right rear tire on a three-axle dump truck blew, 
causing the vehicle to veer to the right. 
In general, the fatal truck crashes precipitated by a blowout, as reported in Table 
2-4, can be divided into the following three scenarios: 
1. If the front left tire blows, the truck loses control to the left, veers into oncoming 
or adjacent traffic, and either rolls immediately or after a collision with another 
vehicle. These crashes are primarily multiple vehicle crashes, with 15 of the 22 
involving two or more vehicles. 
2. If the right front tire blows, the truck loses control to the right, veers off the road 
and either rolls, collides with roadside structures, or both. These are typically 
single-vehicle crashes. Ten of 13 right front tire blowouts were single-vehicle 
crashes. 
3. If a drive or trailer axle blows, the truck typically, though not always, remains 
under control. [Note: In some cases the crash is entirely unrelated to the fllat tire. 
For example, in one case the truck was rear-ended by an alcohol-impaired 
driver. The truck driver said he was driving normally and was on his way to get 
the flat repaired, remarking that "one tire being flat did not slow the truck down 
that much."] 
In 11 of the 52 cases (21.15 percent), the tire blowout did not immediately result 
in a crash. This is based on the observation that in these cases the truck did not lose 
control, but either proceeded at the same speed, or at a slower speed while still 
maintaining control, or was stopped and effecting repairs at the time of the crash. 
Eliminating these cases from the blowout group leaves 41 involvements (0.28 percent of 
all fatal truck crash involvements) in three years where truck tire blowout apparently was 
the immediate cause of the crash. 
None of the cases had any information on why the flat occurred. 
The Dunlap study [I I]  reported that 4 to 5 percent of truck crash involvements on 
the Ohio, Indiana, and Pennsylvania turnpikes were caused by tire failure. This 
percentage is significantly higher than the 0.8 percent tire-failure proportion ad crash 
involvements he found in the Bureau of Motor Carrier Safety (BMCS) - now the 
Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration - data [12], or the 0.35 percent proportion 
of fatal truck involvements reported here. Dunlap did not explore the reasons for the 
higher rates he found on the turnpikes. One explanation could be that turnpikes are high- 
speed roads, with the higher speeds causing heat buildup on under-inflated tires and 
subsequent failure. 
The TIFA data do not support the high turnpike rates found by Dunlap. Turnpikes 
as such are not identifiable in TIFA, but interstate highways are an appropriate surrogate 
for turnpike roads. From 1995 through 1997, only 0.61 percent of fatal truck 
involvements on interstates were related to truck tire blowout. This percentage is far 
lower than the 4 to 5 percent reported in Dunlap on comparable roads. However, the 
proportion on interstates, while very low, is still higher than the 0.35 percentage blowouts 
form of all fatal truck involvements. In fact, 40.38 percent of fatal truck involvements 
related to tire blowout occurred on an interstate highway, compared with 23.41 percent of 
all fatal truck involvements. This is consistent with the heat buildup causal mechanism, 
though there is not enough information in the data to go any further. 
Truck tire blowouts in GES 
The General Estimates System (GES) file is a nationally representative sample of 
police reported crashes. All data are coded from the police reports. No supplemental data 
are used in coding the data. The original police reports are not available for review. 
The GES includes a variable to record vehicle defects similar to that in the FARS 
file. However, a review of TIFA cases showed that, at least for fatal crashes, only about 
40 percent of recorded tire problems are blowouts. It is impossible to conduct a review of 
police reports similar to that done with the TIFA cases, so the tire-defects variable is not 
a useful way to estimate tire blowouts in the GES file. However, the GES includes 
another variable to record the precipitating event in the crash, and one of the codes is for 
control loss due to a tire blowout. Note that blowouts that did not lead to loss of control 
and a crash will be missed, but this precipitating-event variable is probably a good 
surrogate for blowout-related crashes. 
Table 2-5 summarizes blowout-related crash involvements for trucks and 
nontruck vehicles. Loss of control due to tire blowout represents only about a quarter of a 
percent of trucks involved in police-reportable crashes. For nontruck vehicles, which are 
overwhelmingly passenger vehicles, only 0.12 percent had a blowout as the precipitating 
event in the crash. The 0.25 percent of all truck involvements due to tire blowout is 
comparable to the 0.35 percent found for fatal truck crash involvements. 
Three years of data are combined to improve confidence in the estimates. The 
estimated total number of truck blowout crash involvements over three years implies an 
estimate of about 936 truck tire blowout involvements per year nationally. Since GES is a 
sample file, there is an associated sampling error to the estimates. An approximate 95 
percent confidence interval for the estimated 936 annual truck tire blowout crash 
involvements would range from 483 to 1,389. The rate of tire blowouts in all crashes, 
estimated from the GES data, is 1.695 blowout-related truck crashes per billion miles of 
truck travel, compared with an overall truck crash rate of 671.16 truck crash 
involvements per billion miles of travel. 
Most crashes resulting from truck tire blowouts were single-vehicle crashes, 
involving only the truck. In fact, almost 88 percent of truck tire blowout crashes were 

























single vehicle, while only 19.71 percent of other truck crashes were single vehicle:. See 
Table 2-6. 
Table 2-6. Number of vehicles involved for truck blowout 
and other truck crashes. (GES 1995-1997) 
vehicles I blowout I other 
involved 
single vehicle 
Just as in the TIFA data, analysis of the GES data indicates that crashes due to 
truck tire blowout are more likely on interstate roads. Although the Dunlap study cited 
above indicated that 4 to 5 percent of truck crashes on turnpikes are due to tire blowout, 
in the GES data, only 0.63 percent of crashes on interstates were due to tire blowout. 
Still, that percentage is considerably higher than the 0.25 percentage of crashes on all 
road types. In the GES data, fully 50.13 percent of truck crash involvements due to tire 
blowout occurred on interstate roads, compared to 19.96 percent of all truck. crash 
involvements. Heat buildup is a possible explanation. 
multiple vehicle 
tota.1 
In general, it does not appear that truck tire blowouts lead to crashes that are more 
serious than other truck crashes. In the GES data, overall tire blowout crashes are less 
serious than other truck crash involvements. Table 2-7 shows the distribution of crash 
severity as measurecl by the most serious injury in the crash. The distributions are shown 
for tire blowout and non-blowout truck crashes. 
Table 2-7. Crash severity3 for truck-tire blowout and other truck crash 
involvements. (GES 1995-1997) 


















Only GES data are used in the table. Since GES is a sample file, the estimate of 
fatal involvements does not match the estimate from TIFA. The GES estimate for fatal 
tire blowouts is based on a very small number of cases and is not statistically reliable. 
Moreover, estimates from TIFA and GES are not directly comparable because of subtle 
differences between the two files in the definition of a "blowout" crash. In the set of 
crashes identified in GES, the blowout precipitated the crash, while TIFA-identified 
890,729 
1,109,379 
injury, unknown severity 
unknown 
total 
As indicated on the "Traffic Crash Report" (KABCO code). Definitions for the various injuries can be 
found in "Manual on Classification of Motor Vehicle Traffic Accidents", ANSI D16.1-1970, National 







































crashes includes all blowouts, whether the blowout directly led to the crash or not. 
However, the overall GES distribution of crash severity in tire blowout involvements is 
probably about right. Tire blowout crashes are no worse than other truck crash 
involvements, and possibly somewhat less severe. 
Fatalities and injuries in truck tire blowout crashes 
Another approach to characterizing the size of the truck tire blowout problem in 
safety terms is to consider fatalities and injuries resulting from tire blowout crashes. 
Table 2-8 provides counts of trucks and fatalities for 1995 through 1997. All fatal truck 
involvements are shown along with truck tire blowout involvements to show the relative 
magnitude of the problem. Overall, 14,768 trucks were involved in a fatal crash between 
1995 and 1997. These fatal involvements accounted for 16,101 deaths. Of the fatal 
involvements, 52 included a truck tire blowout as part of the crash. These 52 tire blowout 
involvements resulted in 62 total fatalities over the three years. Truck tire blowouts are 
only 0.35 percent of all fatal truck involvements. The 62 fatalities amount to 0.39 percent 
of all the truck-involved fatalities during the period. In other words, 99.61 percent of the 
fatalities occurred in crashes in which truck tire blowout was not involved. 
Table 2-8. Trucks and fatalities for all fatal crashes 
and truck tire blowout fatal crashes. (TIFA 1995-1997) 




The only data base available that permits national estimates of injuries due to 
crashes involving truck tire blowouts is the GES file. Because of the small sample sizes 
and consequent sampling errors discussed above, showing estimates for each of the data 
years is not useful. However, over the three years, 1995 through 1997, an estimated 
357,000 (k46,OOO) persons suffered an injury in a truck crash. Of these, an estimated 663, 
or 0.19 percent, occurred in a crash precipitated by a truck tire blowout. The 95 percent 
confidence interval for injury totals over the three years ranges from 20 to 1306 (large 
variance due to limited sample size). 
1997 
total 
State data analysis 
State files of all police-reported crashes from North Carolina, Texas, Michigan, 
and Washington were reviewed for any information they might contain on tire-blowouts 
in truck crashes. 
North Carolina, Texas, and Michigan record tire "defects" in a vehicle-condition 
variable. Tire defects can include a number of problems other than just flats or punctures. 























it would be necessary to review the original police report. The review of TIFA cases 
reported above showed that only about 40 percent of reported tire defects were blowouts. 
The TIFA file is restricted to fatal crashes, but there is no reason that the blowout 
proportion of tire defects would be any greater in nonfatal crashes. It may even be lower. 
Since tire blowouts are only about 40 percent of tire defects in the TIFA file, it was 
judged not worthwhile to pursue the small number of tire defect cases any further. Any 
analysis of this data would be an analysis of crash involvements that primarily did not 
include a blowout. 111 any case, the rate of tire defects reported in the three state files is 
only about 0.4 to 0.5 percent of all truck crash involvements. This is very close to the 
proportion of tire defects in fatal truck involvements, 0.52 percent also reported in the 
analysis of TIFA cases. 
The State of Washington crash file includes "tire puncture" as a category in a 
"vehicle defectlcondition" variable. Truck crash involvements from the most recent three 
years of Washington data available (1994-19964) were combined into a file for an~alysis. 
The combined file of 21,153 truck involvements over three years includes only 62 truck 
tire blowouts. Thus, only 0.29 percent of truck crash involvements for 1994-1996 in 
Washington state included a tire blowout. This percentage is similar to thle 0.35 
percentage for htal  crashes reported in the analysis of TIFA data. It is also very close to 
the estimate of 0.25 percent of truck involvements from the GES file. 
Table 2-9 shows the proportion of single- and multi-vehicle involvementsl in the 
Washington data. As in the case of the GES data reported in table 2-6 above, tire 
blowouts are predon~inantly single-vehicle crashes. However, the GES file estimated that 
almost 88 percent of tire blowouts result in single-vehicle crashes, while only about 65 
percent of tire blowouts in the Washington data occurred in single-vehicle crashes. 
Table 2-9. Number of vehicles involved for truck blowout 
involvements and other truck involvements, 
(Washington 1994-1996) 
I blowout I other 
multi-vehicle 1 22 1 35.48 1 17.925 1 84.74 
crash type 
single vehicle 
total 1 62 / 100.00 ( 21,153 1 100.00 
This is not a serious discrepancy. The coding in GES is for the event that directly 
led to the crash, while in the Washington data, it is recorded as part of a multiple- 
response variable characterizing vehicle condition. It is likely that some fraction of the 
blowouts do not themselves cause a crash. The review of fatal crashes reported above 
showed that tire blowouts on non-steering axles generally do not seriously affect vehicle 
handling. Moreover, some of the punctures recorded in the Washington data may even be 
the result of the col1:ision. 
The State of Washington changed its data collection system for the 1997 accident year. As a result, the 









In the Washington data, Table 2-10, tire-blowout related crashes appear to be 
somewhat more severe, compared with other truck crash involvements, with somewhat 
higher percentages of nonincapacitating, incapacitating, and fatal injuries. However, it 
should be kept in mind that there are only 62 tire puncture cases in three years of the 
Washington file, so a change of one or two cases can easily explain the differences noted. 
Table 2-10. Crash severity for truck-tire blowout and other truck 
crashes. (Washington 1994-1996) 
I blowout crashes I other crashes 
crash severity 
no injury 







A secondary effect of truck tire blowouts is the debris left on the roadway by 
blowouts. While a blowout can cause a truck to lose control, leading to a crash, the debris 
left from a blowout may cause crashes later on, if light vehicles either strike the debris or 
lose control while trying to avoid the material. Existing crash data files were surveyed for 
any light they could shed on crashes related to running over or dodging tire debris from 
truck tire blowouts. Note that in these crashes, the truck has long since departed the area, 
so these are crashes where it is likely that no truck was involved as a contact vehicle. 
FARS, GES, and files from the states of Michigan, North Carolina, Texas, and 
Washington were examined for any meaningful information on crashes related to truck 
tire debris. Not surprisingly, no file directly codes any information that identifies debris 
from truck tires (which can include retreads), much less tire debris directly associated 
with truck tire blowout events. However, FARS identifies crashes in which the driver 
swerved to avoid debris in the road. GES includes a code for crashes caused by an object 









In FARS, the pertinent variable is a multiple response variable used to record 
"driver-related factors." These factors include any driver action that may have 
contributed to the crash. One of the codes is "avoiding or swerving due to debris or 
objects in the road." The type of debris or object in the road is not identified. It includes 
any non-fixed object in the road: tire debris, mufflers, fallen trees, lost cargo, etc. 
However, since tire debris is included in the code, the number of such cases can serve as 
an upper limit to the incidence of tire debris crashes. In three years of FARS (1995- 
1997), 181 cases were identified where a driver swerved to avoid debris. This amounts to 
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did not necessarily lead immediately to the crash, the GES variable is used to identify the 
immediate "cause" of the crash. Three years of data were examined to identify crashes 
related to objects in the road, 1995 through 1997. In those three years of police-reportable 
crashes, an estimated 0.53 percent of traffic crashes were caused by an object in the road. 
The estimate is for all police-reportable crashes, not just Pita1 crashes. Moreover, crashes 
related to all types of objects in the road are included, not just those caused by tire (debris. 
Any type of object, from an errant soccer ball to a fallen tree, is included. So the estimate 
of 0.53 percent is the maximum proportion of traffic crashes related to truck tire (debris. 
The true proportion (if only those crashes caused by tire debris were included) is likely to 
be much lower. 
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Information Review of Truck Tire Blowouts 
This section of the report includes a summary of information found in library 
resources (journal and article databases, online information services, research reports) 
and industry contacts (professionals and officials who are involved with tire 
manufacturing, maintenance, and management). 
Literature Review 
There has been very little crash analysis with respect to truck tire blowou1.s. The 
National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has investigated six truck crasher; since 
1972 involving "tire failure," but these crashes do not provide a comprehensive picture. 
The crashes investigated by the NTSB encompass a variety of causal mechanisrn~s. The 
following list summarizes the causes of the six NTSB-investigated tire-failure crashes 
(some of these are addressed later in more detail.) 
1. In a 1971 crash, the crash was precipitated by a flat on a passenger car, which 
was being repaired on the side of the road. Traffic backed up and a truck hit 
the queue. There was no blowout on the truck [25]. 
2. ,A crash occurring in 1973 was caused by an undetected nail puncture to a 
front tire of a tractor-semitrailer causing a slow leak. Under-inflation of the 
tire caused heat build-up which in turn led to failure of the tire side wall [17]. 
3. A 1980 crash involving a truck and a school bus was caused by a badly worn 
steering axle tire of a tractor, which had some tread separation. The tire 
finally blew, causing loss of control of the truck [18]. 
4. In a 1983 crash, an undetected nail puncture in the left front tire of a r;chool 
bus caused a slow leak, which in turn resulted in side wall heat buildup and 
subsequent blowout [26]. 
5. In another 1983 crash, a truck was struck by another vehicle. The impact 
ruptured a tire. The blowout was after impact; it did not cause the crash [19]. 
6. In a 1985 crash involving a propane truck, the left front steering axle tire 
suffered tread separation and the driver lost control. The tire probably 
deteriorated over an extended period of time. Previous vibration had been 
noted, tires were found to be out of round and were balanced onl~y with 
difficulty, yet the operator continued to use them. Eventually, the tread 
separated and the tire failed [27]. 
Excessive wear that may cause tread separation, and low inflation pressure: due to 
slow leaks from undetected nail punctures, were the predominant factors among these 
cases. But the cases themselves are essentially anecdotal and therefore provide no insight 
into the magnitude of the truck tire blowout problem or, despite the depth of 
investigation, the pnimary factors associated with tire failure. 
A 1972 report from the Bureau of Motor Carrier Safety (BMCS) [12] concluded 
that tire failures were the second leading cause of mechanical defect-related crashes at 
that time, accounting for 1,186 tire-related crashes from 1968 to 1970. Front tires 
accounted for two-thirds of the tire failures. Right front tires failed more often th~an left, 
possibly due to damage from hitting curbs. Other possible explanations for this 
asymmetry include the crown of the road shifting the truck load to the right, or that a left 
front tire failure may less often lead to a crash since the driver has more time to get the 
vehicle under control (with lighter load on the tire, the steering response to failure will be 
less abrupt.) The proportion of all truck involvements caused by tire failure was not 
addressed. 
In 1977, the relationship between front-axle load of truck tractors and the safe 
operation of such vehicles was addressed in a report to Congress [I]. The study was 
initiated following an increase in allowable gross weight, authorized by the Federal-Aid 
Highway Amendments of 1974 for the interstate system. The new limit of 80,000 lbs. 
would result in a load distribution on the tractor's axles such that 34,000 lbs, could be 
placed on each of the tandem drive axles, while the front axle could carry a maximum 
load of 12,000 lbs. The report focused primarily on the following four aspects of front- 
axle loading: (1) steering effort, (2) directional stability, (3) vibrations and ride, and (4) 
safety issues due to the potential of a front tire failure. 
The report [ I ]  provides historical background to the federal involvement in 
highways since 1802 and describes legislative efforts regarding weight limitations at the 
federal level between 1956 and 1976. Single-axle load limits that were discussed as part 
of the legislation were up to 20,000 lbs. Labor representatives recommended that a load 
restriction of 10,000 lbs. be placed on the front axle to reduce steering effort and increase 
safety in the event of a tire blowout. Manufacturers, on the other hand, recommended 
that no specific load cap be imposed, rather, that the design rating of the tires and 
suspension components be used. 
Results of another study [2], conducted in 1977, evaluated front-tire failure. From 
the limited literature available, it was concluded that front-tire failure was not a major 
causal factor - less than 2% of truck crashes. At the same time, however, it was found 
that such crashes have the highest fatality rate and property damage costs of all truck 
crashes. Additional meaningful findings were: (I) failed tires had significantly less tread 
depth, (2) "significant increase in gross vehicle weight exists for trucks with front tire 
failures compared with other accident involved tires," and (3) tires failed primarily 
because of manufacturing defects. The analysis also finds that "non-significant 
differences exist between failures of left and right tires on the steering axle." Between 
1969 and 1975, there were a total of 298,338 truck crashes, of which 2,290 were front- 
tire crashes (about 0.8%). These crashes resulted in 133 fatalities and in more than 
$2 1,000,000 property damage. 
A similar analysis that was performed in the United Kingdom [3-61 attributed a 
much higher proportion (3% - 12%) of truck crashes to tire failures. However, those 
numbers are regarded with skepticism, as studies by Baker and McIlraith [7-101 showed 
that tire-failures are often alluded to incorrectly as the cause of the crash. 
The report to Congress [I]  also describes tests and simulations that focused on 
investigating the effect of front axle loading on steering effort, directional stability, and 
ride vibrations. The report describes past and current (for 1976) efforts to establish, 
legislate, and enforce axle load limits. To gauge the existing state of affairs, statistical 
data were used to present and analyze the extent and frequency of steering axle loading. 
Recognizing the variety of applications and suspension configurations, alternatives to 
setting some specific axle-load limits are then discussed. 
The conclusions of this steering axle study report by the Bureau of Motor Carrier 
Safety (BMCS) [I]  regarding safety issues associated with front-tire failure, include: (1) 
overloading of tires and/or suspensions beyond the manufacturer's recommended limits is 
unsafe and may cause a crash; (2) "front tire failure accidents are usually more severe 
since steering control of the vehicle may be lost"; (3) crashes caused by front tire failure 
are rare, and usually result in single-vehicle crashes; (4) in 1974, a small percentage of 
commercial vehicles have a front-axle load of 10,000 lbs., and a much smaller percentage 
had front-axle loads over 12,000 lbs.; (5) "data are not presently available that justify 
limiting the load on front axles to 10,000 pounds." The 1977 BMCS repoirt also 
conclutles with a recommendation not to pass federal legislation that specifies a front- 
axle load limit, "but the tire loading requirements of the Federal Motor Carrier Safety 
Regulations should be a requirement for all commercial motor vehicles, whether in 
interstate or intrastate commerce." 
Findings from another study [ I l l  in 1974 conducted by HSRI (Highway Safety 
Research Institute -- now known as UMTRI), were extensively used in the report to 
congress [I]. These findings provided similar statistical results as noted above. Data 
sources included (1) the BMCS crash reports, (2) crash records from two large carriers, 
(3) three years of crash data from the State of Texas, and (4) crash data from the states of 
Indiana, Ohio, and Pennsylvania turnpikes. 
Dunlap's report [ l l ]  is the most comprehensive crash analysis on truck tire 
blowout in the last thirty years. About 4 to 5 percent of all truck crash involvements were 
linked to tire failure. Dunlap did not address the discrepancy between the rate of 
involvement derived from the BMCS data and the much higher rates from the turnpike 
data. In general, Dunlap found that truck crashes resulting from tire failure were 
predominantly single-vehicle crashes, involving neither injury nor death. 
Literature, interviews, and crash databases were used in HSRI's report [ l l ]  to 
analyze the extent of a truck tire blowout occurrences, and to asses the character and 
frequency of the resulting crashes. One of the main findings in this study was that "in 
general, truck crashes resulting from tire failure were found to be so rare as to malke only 
a minor contribution to the total body of accident statistics." And also "...because such 
accidents are almost always single-vehicle involvements, the traveling public is not 
greatly endangered by the occasional accident resulting from the failure of a truck tire." 
This study also amplified the finding of [ l ]  that, for the most part, tire-failure cras,hes are 
single-vehicle crashes. However, regarding fatalities, the report to congress study [I]  
found that "these accidents have the highest fatality," while the HSRI study [ l l ]  vvas less 
clear, noting that "the fatality rate ... is greater .. . in the State of Texas and on the 
Indiana Turnpike, but less . . . on the Ohio and Pennsylvania Turnpikes." 
Regarding the lefttright failure rate of front-axle tire blowouts, the HSRI study 
[I I]  differs from the Biotechnology report [2] insofar as observing somewhat more right- 
side tire failures, versus a more even lefvright distribution cited in [2]. 
Another important aspect of tire failures that was addressed in the HSRI study 
regarded the failure of retreaded tires. Based on BMCS data [12-161, the study states that 
"it is evident that the majority of tires which fail in tire-failure accidents are tires with 
original grooves." The explanation given is that since retreaded tires are typicillly not 
mounted on steering axles, and since most tire-failure crashes are due to a fai1r:d front 
tire, that "if a tire fails and causes an accident, it will typically be a front tire with original 
grooves." 
Of those factors cited in [ I l l  as potential reasons for tire failure, maintenance 
practice seems to be most significant. Though the study recognizes that "worn tread is 
not a major cause of front-tire failure," it also includes results from BMCS roadside- -
inspection reports that "4% of the inspected tractor-trailer units had front axles which 
were potentially overloaded. . . . as much as 60% of the front tires were under-inflated." 
Findings from the literature, mostly point out that maintenance is the main cause 
for highway truck tire blowouts. This view is also shared rather widely by the tire and 
trucking industry (see feedback from industry contacts in Section 4). Crash reports by the 
NTSB also support this observation. A crash report [17] from October 1973, describes a 
crash where the front-left tire (tubed) of a tractor-semitrailer blew out on the New Jersey 
Turnpike, causing the truck to veer to the left through the guardrail and into the oncoming 
traffic where it collided with a passenger car and a Greyhound bus. The two occupants of 
the passenger car, the bus driver and six passengers were killed. The NTSB concluded 
that the tire blowout was caused by a sidewall failure due to under-inflation. The state of 
under-inflation was the result of a slow air leak caused by a nail. 
Another NTSB crash report [ la ]  from April 1980, describes a crash where the 
front-left tire (tubed) of a truck-tractor blew out on a rural two-lane California highway. 
As a result the tractor swerved to the left, crossed the centerline, and collided head-on 
with a schoolbus. The bus driver and three students were killed. The NTSB concluded 
that the tire blowout was caused by inadequate maintenance by the trucking company. 
The deterioration of the tire was gradual, and should have been detected during 
inspection. California Highway Patrol Inspectors were also interviewed since the vehicle 
was inspected 6 days before the crash without detecting the unsafe tire. 
In an April 1983 NTSB investigation, the front-left tire of a tractor car-carrier 
semitrailer travelling on a rural two-lane New-York highway hit a towed farming device 
and blew out [19]. As a result, the tractor swerved to the left, crossed the centerline, and 
collided head-on with a bus. The bus driver and four passengers were killed. The NTSB 
concluded that the tire blowout was caused by a reason unrelated to the truck's operation 
and maintenance. However, the loss of control was attributed to the front tire blowout. 
Reference [20] is a 1964 collection of papers focused on cost issues that are 
related to commercial truck tires. The parts of this collection that pertain to tire failure are 
those that discuss retreading and tire life as affected by faulty maintenance and 
operations. It should be noted that when these articles were written, bias-ply, tubed tires 
dominated the market. At that time, the usage of tubeless radials have not yet reached a 
significant level with commercial fleets. The benefits of retreads are noted and measured 
in terms of dollars/mile (from new until the tire is scrapped). Regarding failures of 
retreaded tires "most part of the blame is generally placed on either poor inspection of the 
retread candidates or poor shop practices." However the article goes on to indicate that 
"our experience has shown that in tires with a sound carcass retreaded in a first-class 
facility, there will be very few premature failures." Interestingly, the article states that 
even though tubeless tires are more likely to "slowout rather than blowout," (slowly leak) 
they have a higher potential to become inferior retreads. When a tubeless tire is punctured 
in such manner that a slow leak develops, the initial air pressure can penetrate the plies in 
the carcass, causing earlier separation and other oxygen-induced deterioration. 
'To date, the 1975 report by Dynamic Science [22] is the only documented effort 
that was found which performed a side-by-side evaluation of commercially-available 
devices for minimizing the effect (not the occurrence) of tire blowout. The report 
summarizes work done by Ultrasystems, Inc., under contract with the BMCS (Bureau of 
Motor Carrier Safety). In addition to the testing of devices, the work encompassed 
investigating the magnitude of the front-tire failure problem, and testing of baseline tire 
failure for later comparison. Core assessment of the magnitude of the problem is similar 
to those determined in [I] and [ l l ]  and is based on related data sources. 
The Dynamic Science report [22] also describes the dynamics associated with 
directional control of truck tractors, including steering and suspension geometry. A 
simplified analysis showed that if the truck is on a straight course, a tire failure will 
translate into a manageable addition of 20 lbs. of force and 12 degrees turn of the steering 
wheel. If the tire fails on a curve, the lateral load transfer compounds the problem., and it 
may cause up to 60 Ibs. additional steering effort, and a 200 degree steering wheel turn. 
An exploded sidewall may also result in a brief impulse of up to approximately 150 Ibs. 
This situation was determined to be very rare. 
Road tests of tire blowouts by Dynamic Science while travelling in a straight line 
at 50 mph with a loaded five-axle tractor-semi supported their simplified analysis noted 
above and indicated about 23 ft-lbs of required driver steering wheel torque to trim the 
vehicle in straight-line recovery. Peak values of steering wheel torque were in the 
vicinity of 60 ft-lbs; peak steering wheel angles were about 180 degrees. Road tests also 
noted that within 6 seconds of the driver-initiated blowout, the tractor-trailer combination 
had traversed about 2.3 ft (average) off its course. (For unprepared drivers, the truck is 
likely to travel further into the adjacent lane.) 
Twelve "counter-measure" devices were evaluated by Dynamic Science in [22], 
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Figure I. Steer Safe 
Three other devices were similar in principle, but employed hydraulic shock 
absorbers instead of springs. Two were axle designs ("Center Point," and "Centerline") 
that eliminate the offset between the kingpin and the rim's centerline, thus reducing the 
leverage of the increased drag force from the deflated tire acting to steer the truck. 
Another device was an air-actuated power assist (like a bolt-on version of power 
steering). 
The last two devices were individual designs which involved the tiretrim 
assembly: a (then) newly-developed tire (Cantilever), whose width and structure 
characteristics were such that reduced the likelihood of the sidewalls buckling and 
collapsing under the rim, and a "Safety Roller" insert, with a design similar to the 
"RunFlat" by Hutchinson (see Figure 2). 
Figure 2. Hutchinson's RunFlat 
Table 3-1 shows test results of the various devices evaluated by Dynamic Science 
[22] relative to the baseline test condition (shown in the first row of the table). 
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The first table column lists the device variation, followed by three columns of test 
measurements showing: 1) mean steering wheel torque following blowout, 2) 
corresponding mean tire-rod force, and 3) the maximum lateral deviation of the vehicle 
within 6 seconds of the blowout. 
A simulation study of the directional behavior of a truck-tractor combination 
following a front-lefi. tire blowout was also examined in a 1979 SAE paper entitled "The 
effect of vehicle design on post blowout controllability" [21] by Bernard and Sh~apley. 
Their analysis used both linear and nonlinear simulation models. The models assunne that 
following a tire blowout, a large amount of drag force is created accompanied by no side 
force. The assumed post-blowout normalized drag force coefficient for the blown tire was 
0.3. The two main findings of this study were: (1) "the steer angle required to maintain a 
straight trajectory after a front wheel blowout is inversely proportional to wheellbase," 
and (2) "decreasing wheelbase and increasing compliance in the steering system serve to 
increase the severity of the post-blowout problem." An example simulation result 
showed that when the front tire of a baseline tractor with a 140 inch wheelbase blows out, 
the transient response required at the steering wheel (to maintain a straight trajectory) has 
a peak value of 180 degrees, and a steady state value of about 50 degrees. 
To illustrate these observations further, Appendix A of this report includes results 
of computer analyses for left vs. right truck tire blowout scenarios using an existing 
UMTRI computer model. The simulation analysis helps to provide additional technical 
insight into the likely vehicle responses produced by front tire blowouts on heavy 
vehicles. The simulation results tend to support many of the observations reported in the 
technical literature and the crash statistics that cite the importance of front tire (steering 
axle) blowouts and the likelihood of ensuing path disturbances to the truck. 
Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations, Rules and Notices 
Some people in the tire and trucking industry as well as the public, though not 
necessarily the majority, view retreaded tires as a pitfall to safety, and as a significant 
contributing factor to tire failures - from premature disintegration as "road gataas," up 
to blowout-related crashes. Based on data in the literature as summarized above, this 
notion does not seem to be strongly validated. In addition, information from industry 
surveys and interviews (see Section 4), further weakens that notion. Against that 
backdrop, a pertine,nt question is: What does the law say regarding limits of use of 
reconditioned tires (r. etreaded, recapped, or regrooved)? 
Early regulatory efforts which led to current rules are presented in [23]. Iit is one 
in a series of suggested regulations composed by the members of the Truck and Bus Tire 
Committee of the Federal Vehicle Equipment Safety Commission in 1973. It is not clear 
what the final outcome of this regulation was or what form it eventually took, but it 
appears very similar in form and content to the current Federal Motor Carrier Safety 
Regulation (I'MCSK) issued by USDOT [24]. Section 6.1 of document [23] states what 
shall be considered unsafe in regards to tire installations on the front axle of power units 
(trucks, tractors, etc,,). Item (e) specifies as unsafe (for front-axle installation): 
Any tire which has been retreaded, recapped, or regrooved, except that they 
are permissible when used on vehicles in intra-city (city and suburban) 
service or on vehicles 10,000pounds gross vehicle weight or less. 
This definition of unsafe tire installation could not be found in the current 
FMCSR rules. However, a less strict version of such prohibition does appear in Appendix 
G to subchapter B of the regulation (see discussion below). At the same time, a limitation 
on installing retreaded tires on the front axle of buses is included in section 393.75 of the 
FMCSR, but it is not part of this VESC-9 regulation [23]. 
It appears that the FMCSR is the latest evolution of the work performed by the 
Federal Vehicle Equipment Safety Commission, summarized in the VESC regulation. 
What is the current ruling? The pertinent Federal Motor Carrier Safety 
Regulations are found under Part 393, entitled "Parts and Accessories Necessary for Safe 
Operation." It is stated in subpart G - Miscellaneous Parts and Accessories, section 
393.75 ("Tires") that: 
(d)  No bus shall be operated with regrooved, recapped or retreaded 
tires on the front wheels. 
(e)  No truck or truck tractor shall be operated with regrooved tires on 
the front wheels which have a load carrying capacity equal to or 
greater than that of 8.25-20 8 ply rating tires. 
(NOTE: The FHWA is proposing to amend 5 393.75(e) in order to make the 
requirements easier to understand. Section 393.75(e) prohibits the use of regrooved tires 
which have a load carrying capacity greater than that of 8.25-20 8-ply rating tires, but 
does not specify the load range rating for this tire. According to the Tire and Rim 
Association's 1996 Year Book, an 8.25-20 bias ply tire has a maximum load carrying 
capacity of 2,232 kg (4,920 pounds) at 793 kPa (115 psi) cold inflation pressure. This 
maximum capacity applies to tires of load range G. Tires with the load range of E and F 
have maximum load carrying capacities of 1,837 kg (4,050 pounds) and 2,041 kg (4,500 
pounds), respectively. The FHWA is proposing to use the 2,232 kg limit under 5 393.75.) 
Furthermore, interpretation and guidance for these regulations listed on FHWA's 
website, provide the following question and answer: 
5 Question 3: May a vehicle transport HM when equipped with retreaded 
tires? 
Guidance: Yes. The only CMV that may not utilize retreaded tires is a bus, 
and then only on its front wheels. 
However, Appendix G to subchapter B - "Minimum Periodic Inspection 
Standards" states that "a vehicle does not pass an inspection if it has one of the following 
defects or deficiencies," and under the section that addresses tires, the following 
deficiency is stated: 
(9) Regrooved tire except motor vehicles used solely in urban or suburban 
sew ice. 
This suggests that trucks are not allowed to operate on the highways with 
regrooved front tires, even if the load carrying capacity is less than that which is specified 
by section 393.75(e) above (the equivalent to 8.25-20 8 ply rating tires). Consequently, 
Hazardous Material 
the regulations and associated explanations seem to be confusing on the matter of retread 
usage. 
Patent Database Research 
Databases of U.S. patents (both domestic and foreign registration) were searched 
for devices, methods, and systems that are aimed at detecting, correcting, andlor 
preventing event sequences that can potentially lead to tire blowout. Most of these 
patented inventions, in one form or another, have already been discussed under the 
literature review and/or will be described in the context of future applications in the next 
section that discusses industry contacts. This section provides some specifics of the 
patent database research and details about pertinent patents not covered in other sections 
of the report. 
During the last two decades, hundreds of patents related to tire safety and 
maintenance were registered. In many cases, what seems to be the same device, system, 
or method may have more than one patent registered. The bulk of these patents can be 
divided into three groups: 
(1) recent development - new technology that is either under development or 
under advanced prototyping tests, 
(2) commercially available - products that are available in the market, an~d 
(3) exotic - products that were developed in the past and hold some potential, 
though their commercial availability is unlikely or limited 
The patents described here fall primarily into groups (2) and (3). As one: might 
expect from the nature of the tire industry, new developments are under strict 
confidentiality limitations. 
However, information obtained from industry contacts indicates that the "hot 
spot" of upcoming tire development lies in what is often referred to as the Smart Tire: an 
integrated circuit that is embedded in the tire will monitor and/or report tire condition 
(e.g., pressure, temperature, etc.). Practically all the main tire manufacturers are working 
on such a system, and it has a promising potential for near-future deployment that will 
significantly reduce the frequency of maintenance-related tire failures (the cited cause of 
most tire blowouts). 
The following list is a representative collection of patented inventions foc~~sed  on 
tire safety and maintenance, U.S. patent numbers are cited in parentheses. As noted 
above, there is often more than one patent that describes similar systems. The last four 
items represent patents related to the Smart Tire. They date as far back as 1970. However, 
due to the lack of applicable technology, they were not put into a commercial-application 
track until recently. 
Dispenser for injecting viscous sealant into tire to protect against blowouts and 
punctures (5,908,145). The dispenser is filled with viscous sealing fluid which is 
admitted into the tire via a flexible hose and a pneumatic valve. Its purpose is to 
protect the tire against subsequent blowouts or punctures. 
Back up tire within tubeless tire (5,885,383). The back up tire is made of semi- 
elastic material mounted on the rim of the vehicle wheel and serves as a cushion 
between the rim edges and the tread of the tubeless tire when complete deflation 
occurs. It prevents the complete collapse of rims onto the outer tire, to avoid loss of 
control and minimize damage to both tire and rim in the event of a blowout. 
Internal flexible casing (5,840,274). A casing ring formed from rolled flexible 
laminated plastic sheets with air spaces between them inside the tire. The sheets are 
rolled into a cylindrical shape and formed into a ring so the opposite ends of the 
cylinder are adjacent. Its purpose is to help the tire to resists deflation when 
severely punctured or subject to a blowout. 
Onboard tire inflation system (4,498,515). Air inflation and control system for road 
vehicle and trailer tires. It has air line from an on-board compressor that is 
connected via a rotary pipe union to the tire's air valves. 
Security tire (4,305,444). A pneumatic tire and rim combination wherein the tire is 
captivated about the rim and a chamber is defined between the tire and the rim and 
a portion of the tire extends into the chamber within the carcass of the tire and 
serves as an annular support structure upon deflation of air within the tire, so that if 
it collapses, as by a blowout, a vehicle on which it is installed will continue to be 
supported by the tire as the interiorly extending annular portion of the tire engages 
the confronting surface of the rim. 
Tire pressure monitoring system (4,148,008). A wireless tire pressure monitoring 
system warns a driver of a vehicle of low pressure in one or more of its tires so that 
the driver may take corrective action before a tire blowout occurs. A pressure 
transducer, transmitter and antenna are integrally housed and mounted to the tire 
stem of a tire. When the pressure transducer senses a tire pressure below a pre- 
selected pressure, the transmitter broadcasts a radio signal that, upon detection by a 
receiver mounted on the vehicle, warns the driver of abnormally low pressure. In a 
preferred embodiment, the transmitter is a SAW (surface acoustical wave) device 
that is periodically interrogated by an RF signal from a transmitter on the vehicle. 
Air pressure control for dual tires (3,760,859). A device for equalizing the pressure 
in the pneumatic tires of a dual wheel assembly, employs a valve shuttle which has 
three positions: (a) it isolates pressure in one tire, (b) it equalizes the pressure 
between the tires, and (c) it isolates pressure in the other tire. A fill valve assembly 
has an element for holding the valve shuttle in position (b) so that the tire pressures 
are equalized during filling. Also, the valve shuttle closes by pressure differential in 
the case of a blowout or puncture of one of the tires, to prevent loss of pressure 
from the other tire. Furthermore, a pressure relief valve is provided to prevent 
overpressure in either of the tires. 
A heat detecting tire (a tire heat detecting system, 3,875,558). A coating of a heat 
sensitive electrically-conductive material set to melt at about 250-300°F over the 
inner surface of the tire and the bead area of the tire. The coating is done in such a 
way, that it causes a completion of a circuit through the tire when the tire is heated 
to excessive operating temperatures. It enables sensing when blowout conditions 
are approached and provides a warning thereof. Also, means are provided for 
detecting under-inflation of a tire and warning the driver to prevent tire destruction 
from under-inflation. 
Dispensing fluid within a tire (4,130,144). An enclosed container having a divided 
chamber with an air pressure section and a liquid coolant section separateld by a 
pressure-transmitting wall. When the tire loses air, the liquid is released into the tire 
cavity to an amount below the normal operating pressure as in the event of a 
puncture or blowout for cooling and lubrication of the tire. 
A low tire pressure warning system. (3,665,387, 1970 by Goodyear) For any 
number of wheels of a vehicle, provides dashboard indications of system operation 
and low pressure conditions while the vehicle is in motion. A pair of coils mounted 
on each wheel are interconnected under normal conditions by a switch responsive to 
tire pressure and periodically, due to wheel rotation, quench an oscillator circuit by 
reversing the normal magnetic field occurring in a second pair of coils in the 
oscillator. A low pressure condition or inoperativeness of the circuit is recognized 
by a red lamp indication or absence of any indication. A minimal warning system 
for a multiple wheeled vehicle are tire pressure switches for truck and passenger car 
applications. 
An active integrated circuit transponder mounted in or on a vehicle tire (5,4813,827). 
A pressure sensor, a temperature sensor and a tire rotation sensor are mounted on a 
substrate along with the integrated circuit transponder chip, the power supply, and 
an antenna. Upon receiving an interrogation signal from a remote source, the 
transponder activates the sensors to sense tire pressure and temperature and 
transmits an encoded radio frequency signal to the remote source containing serial, 
encoded tire identification, tire position on the vehicle, current tire pressure, (current 
tire temperature and accumulated tire revolutions, as well as maximum andlor 
minimum tire and temperature pressure values encountered over a predetermined 
time period and other information specific to the tire. 
A method and system for monitoring and measuring the amount of deflection of a 
pneumatic tire (5,749,984, 1998 by Michelin). A monitoring system in t.he tire 
detects tire sidewall deflection by measuring the length of the tire contact patch area 
relative to the total circumference of the tire. The embedded sensor device 
generates a signal which varies as it passes through the tire contact patch wit:hin the 
tire on a moving vehicle, The sensor's electrical signals are digitized and counted 
to determine deflection, tire speed and the number of tire revolutions. 
A method for monitoring various physical conditions of pneumatic tires, including a 
monitoring device (5,562,787, 1996 by Bridgestone). The invention relates to a 
method of monitoring tires which uses an active, self-powered programmable 
electronic device which is installed in or on the interior surface of a pneumatic tire 
or on a tire rim. This device can be used for monitoring, storing, and telem~etering 
information such as temperature, pressure, tire rotations and/or other operating 
conditions of a pneumatic tire, along with tire identification information. The: device 
can be activated by externally transmitted radio frequency waves or microwaves 
and in response, the device compares or transmits information and provides a 
warning in the event a pre-selected limit is exceeded. 
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Blowout Resistant Tire Developments and Related 
Industry Contacts 
The surveyed industry views maintenance as the primary cause for tire bl~owout. 
Consequently, their attempts to solve the problem are mainly focused on addressing the 
source. A great deal of effort goes into helping fleets in developing proper maint'enance 
procedures and driver education. In addition, there are technological developments and 
specific hardware intended to assist in the task of monitoring and maintaining the tires. 
Potential devices aimed at minimizing the potential for tire blowouts are: 
Central inflat,ion/monitoring system - the most promising and accepted in terms 
of cost-benefit and applicability. 
Monitoring by "Smart Tire" and computer chip technology - under 
development. 
Supporting inserts - potentially helpful, currently used only on military and 
security vehicles. 
Tire filling (e.g., with some rubber substance) - not applicable for highway 
trucks due to heat. 
Information from various entities related to the tire industry and tire usage have 
been collected via interviews and official publications. These organizations include tire 
manufacturers, industry organizations, manufacturers of other tire-related products, truck 
fleets, and the U.S. Army. This section presents summaries of the information obtained 
from each organization. 
Maintenance Council of ATA (American Trucking Associations) 
Ms. P. Fisher from the Maintenance Council provided information about a study 
entitled "Tire and Retreads in the Commercial Truck Market," conducted by Newport 
Communication in 1998. This study is an outcome of investigated "tire usage, 
maintenance, specification and purchase for both new tires and retreads." Some of the 
main findings that pertain to tire usage and maintenance are that: 
Retreads are used by 78% of the fleets. 
Retreads are used on 46% of drive axles. 
Retreads are used on 61% of trailer axles. 
Short-haul (local / regional carriers) fleets hurt most by road hazard damages 
(17% of failures) 
Short-haul (local / regional carriers) fleets use significantly more retreads tlhan 
long-haul fleets. 
The bigger the tire the longer its life. 
More than 90% of the fleets perform their own inflation checks. 
60% outsource tire maintenance. 
* 88% maintain tire records. 
Cost per mile: 75% calculate it for new tires, 82% do not calculate it for retreads. 
Retread's life is 67%-78% of a new tire, depending on haul length. 
Interim results were presented in March 1999 from an ongoing task force on tire 
debris prevention (aka "Rubber on the Road" task force). This task force was put together 
by the Maintenance Council (since 1995), and it is chaired by Ms. Fisher. Findings of the 
task force were: 
Under-inflation caused about 86% of tire failures. 
There is an increase in maintenance issues. 
Fleet surveys about obstacles to proper tire maintenance, indicate that 58% 
drivers do not pay attention, 52% drivers do not think tire maintenance in their 
job, and 32% of drivers lack proper tire maintenance education. 
Only 67% of fleets have written tire maintenance procedures. 
Fleet surveys indicate that only 22% of drivers check pressure before each trip; 
only 37% use a pressure gauge; 87% of the fleets check pressure every 60 days 
or less on the tractor and every 90 days or less on the trailer. 
Rubber Manufacturers Association (RMA) 
RMA has no statistics regarding recent tire-blowout data. Regarding blowout- 
related devices, RMA supported the information gathered from other sources, that no 
anti-blowout, or post-blowout stabilizing devices are currently used on heavy commercial 
trucks. For the most part, the industry is focused on the root of the problem - 
maintenance. 
"Tire Chip," "Smart Tire," etc., - different names for a similar product concept 
- is under development by most tire companies. It involves the placement of a 
computer chip in the tire so that it stores information and transmits it. It is not yet ready 
or available for application in heavy commercial trucks. One of the reasons is technical 
difficulty in having to survive the multiple life cycles: it has to be part of the carcass of 
the tire, so that when the tire gets stripped and retreaded or regrooved, the chip would still 
maintain its functionality. Additional issues that need to be resolved are: (1) the ability to 
provide simple golno-go information instead of pressure and temperature values, and (2) 
bookkeeping issues regarding keeping track of the tires, rotating tire locations, mixing 
trucks and tractors, etc. 
In response to an inquiry regarding means that are viewed by the RMA as 
supportive for tire preventative maintenance, and which are used by fleets, they point to 
the central tire inflation system (such as Pressure Systems International by Meritor, 
Cycloid, and Hutchinson). It monitors and/or maintains proper tire pressure. In principle 
it senses air losses per axle, or in the case of some more elaborate systems - per side of 
the axle, and it warns the driver (about an axle or an axle-side, but not an individual tire) 
if it deems that the pressure loss is abnormal. It also has the capability to automatically 
correct the problem (only to a limited extent) by inflating the tire. 
Concerning retreads on a front axle, the norm in industry practices (though the 
law might allow a more lenient approach), is to install the newest tires on the front axle 
for best steering and because of the crucial impact of that location in regards to blowout. 
As the tire gets old, it is generally moved rearward onto successive axles. There are 
exceptions to this practice, however, as in the case of trash truck. Because of the abuse 
that their front axles are subjected to and the multiple retreading they receive, the 
"freshest" tire is not always mounted on the front axle. 
Tire Retread Information Bureau (TRIB) 
One of the main focuses of TRIB is to refute the unjust blaming of retreads for 
tire failures (blowouts and "road gators"). The vast majority of these incidents involve 
bad maintenance, low pressure, overloading, or other factors that are not related to the 
fact whether the tire was retreaded or not. By examining samples of tire debris on the 
road, they show that they contain carcass elements (ply belts) which indicate fai.lure at 
locations other than the retread area (retreading involves only the rubber in the tread 
area.) 
According to TRIB, disintegration and blowout of tires can almost always be 
attributed to lacking maintenance: under-inflation, overloading, tire mismatching, etc. 
Regarding means to avoid that phenomenon (other then proper driver and fleet 
maintenance procedures), it was indicated that central tire inflation systems hold a 
promising potential. As it was maintained "[a central tire inflation system] is a system 
whose time has come - it is only a matter of time before all heavy commercial truc:ks will 
have it." This system has a tremendous long-term value as far as safety and tire life." 
U.S. Army Tank-Automotive Command (TACOM) 1 Radian 
The U.S. Army uses CTIS (Central Tire Inflation System) to maintain and control 
pressure. However, these systems are employed only in tactical vehicles, primarily by 
their mission definition (not in highway commercial-type trucks such as the 
M915lM916). The system's response is rather slow, and the tires sometimes fail during 
the transition time because they are under-inflated for the loading and speed conditions 
(that is, when drivers do not wait to complete inflation when getting on the highway.) 
Devices such as Hutchinson's "RunFlat" are used on tactical vehicles, especially 
Hummers and lighter trucks. They also used bead-locks without the supporting insert ring 
(also by Hutchinson), to hold the tire beads in their place on the rim, in case olf a tire 
failure. 
Most failures come from the sidewall ("zipper" failure.) When the vehicle is used 
off the road, they must run under-inflated to increase mobility. The added vertical 
flexibility of the tire stresses the sidewall, and the generated heat causes premature tire 
failure (especially when a hot, stressed tire gets on the road and start being operated at 
highway speeds, before cooling down and/or reaching proper inflation pressure.) In 
addition, impacts with off-road objects (rocks, etc.) magnify the tire-damaging problem, 
and increase the likelihood of the tire blowing out. Often, ply cords break inside the tire 
with no outside indication that will provide a warning for an imminent tire failure. 
Radian is an engineering services corporation, which provides (among other 
clients) technical support services to TACOM. They are working in cooperation with 
TACOM on developing an infrared (IR) -based system to detect defectslpotential failures 
in the tire. 'The core idea is based on the hypothesis that the heat buildup can be 
characterized and related to various potential failure modes. Currently they are testing 
tires to build a knowledge base and to create databases of answers for questions such as: 
What do good tires look like to the IR camera? How do certain defectsldamages seen on 
the IR image? The objective is that eventually, by having a truck driven past the IR 
camera (e.g., when going over the scales in a weighting station), the tire image will 
provide information that will allow an immediate analysis of the "health status" of the tire 
and even to predict an imminent failure so that the tire can be prevented from going on 
the road again. 
The following two infrared photographs in Figure 3 illustrate the benefits and the 
potential of this IR system. The top picture was taken in a laboratory during a research 
work involving thermal-imaging analysis of tires (US. Army TACOWTARDEC report 
"EndurancelInfrared Tire Test," dated 29 March, 1999.) The picture shows the top half 
of a tire with broken cords which were not apparent externally. The second picture is a 
frame captured from a video made by Radian Inc. intended to demonstrate the concept of 
using thermal-imaging video camera to monitor the condition of truck tires as they go by. 
The direction of motion is from left to right, and clearly the rear dual set is hotter than the 
front set. However, there are no apparent hot-spots, 
r- Broken Cords 
Figure 3. TACOM 1 Radian Infrared Photographs 
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Inquiries regarding tire-blowout experience of some major trucking fleets indicate 
that most fleets view blowout prevention as more of a cost issue than a safety issue. In 
addition, blowout of a front-axle tire followed by the loss of control is considered a very 
rare event, one that a trained and alert driver could avoid. Proper tire maintenance 
practices should be applied to all the tires on the rig, regardless of their location. In 
addition, they affirm RMA's assessment that the norm in industry practices is to install 
the newest tires on the front axle for best steering and due to the importance of tlhat tire 
location. The general notion is that "...unless you hit a road hazard, your front tires will 
not blow." 
For the most part, fleets are concerned with the rear tires and the trailer tires. They 
are almost exclusively installed in a dual configuration. When one tire fails, the driver 
may not even notice it until the damage is too high. The tire may disintegrate, with its 
debris impacting upon its dual mate (which is already overloaded, carrying the load of 
two tires), and possibly causing it to fail as well. This mode of failure nnay be 
accompanied by fire. The common method fleets use to combat this issue (in addition to 
maintenance practices) are systems such as central inflation and pressureltemperature 
monitors. 
Tire Manufacturers 
All the tire manufacturers unanimously agree with the assertion that inadequate 
maintenance - through its various aspects - is the leading cause for tire blowouts. 
From the findings of the "Rubber on the Road" Task Force (noted earlier), tlhe vast 
majority of tire failures are due to maintenance issues (90% were under-inflation). As a 
result, the industry is focused on the source of the problem as the means to prevent it. 
Specifics that were learned from individual manufacturers are provided below. 
Goody ear 
The company puts significant efforts into educating drivers and fleets about tire 
maintenance, including providing them with computer programs to help manage tires and 
maintenance. Blowout is a maintenance issue. Because of the control-loss ramifications, 
front tires are usually checked by the drivers, and are considered best-mairrtained. 
Therefore they "almost never blow out" (some staff reported that in 20 years of being in 
the business, front-tire blowouts were largely unheard of). Even when driving lover an 
object, the front tire most often just "flips" it, and the rear tire gets blown. Trailer t:ires are 
most abused and most neglected, hence they are the ones that blow out most oftein (lease 
trailers, etc.) The industry addresses tire blowouts by education. A driver who is elducated 
about tire maintenance and who pays attention to the tire's condition and air pressure will 
very likely not have a blowout. 
Goodyear developed a blowout-resistant tire which can only be used on passenger 
cars. Run-Flat (Goodyear's system, not to be confused with Hutchinson's that is 
described later in this section) is built into the tire (not an insert). It is a sidewall 
reinforcement that supports the tire and prevents it from collapsing in the case otf a flat. 
Consequently, when a flat occurs, it may not be noticeable by viewing the tire. Therefore 
run-flat-equipped cars must also be equipped with a sensor system at each wheel to alert 
the driver to any loss of pressure. The low-pressure sensor system can be easily installed 
on any vehicle fitted with Goodyear run-flat tires. For passenger cars, it is designed to be 
driven with no air pressure for up to 50 miles at 55 mph and still be fully repairable. 
When evaluated for commercial heavy-truck application, Goodyear found that the 
sidewall would have to be 9 inches thick to support the vehicle when the air is lost, which 
is impractical (heat, weight, etc.) 
Currently, there are no commercial means to prevent blowouts on trucks or to 
improve controllability in the case of a front-tire failure. 
Michelin 
Practically all the tire companies are working on electronic chips in attempts to 
monitor pressurelheat. There are various applications: extracting detailed information 
(what is the pressure? What is the temperature?) versus a passlfail type of information 
(too hot/pressure too low). There are also data-related variations: data that are transmitted 
continuously to the cab versus data that are transmitted only as alarms, or data that are 
not transmitted at all. Rather, readers scan chips periodically at truck stops, etc. Cost 
will determine the various configurations that will be marketed. 
There are challenges in applying this chip: It must be resilient enough to survive 
the thin tread of a worn tire, and to survive the intense heat of retreading. In addition, the 
installation must survive the extremely flexible environment of the sidewall. 
The opinion of one Michelin engineer is that the number one reason for tire 
blowout is low pressure. However, it is not only maintenance: road debris which causes a 
puncture often leads to a blowout. He suggested looking at the statistics of blowouts, its 
correlation with the availability of funds for road maintenance, and the type of roads the 
truck travels on. In other words, road cleanup may have a meaningful contribution to tire 
blowout prevention. 
Regarding Goodyear's patented run-flat for trucks: the technology to make 
something like it is almost here, It will not fully sustain the shape of a properly inflated 
tire, rather it will prevent the total collapse that results in loss of control (allowing a 
"limp-home" mode). Commercializing such a tire is mostly a cost issue. Michelin has 
developed "PAX" (see Figure 4), which is another run-flat device (similar to 
Hutchinson's). It was shown in trade and auto shows for passenger cars so far, but the 
concept also can be applied to trucks. 
Several after-market pressure monitors may be a possible solution until the chip- 
in-the-tire technology is commercially available. Examples include SmartTire by a 
Canadian company, Schereder, Eaton, etc. Central tire inflation pressure systems are a 
significant step towards reducing blowouts. 
Figure 4. Michelin PAX System 
Bridgestone 
Bridgestone has reservations about the term "blowout"; they instead refer to this 
event as instantaneous air loss. The company shares the view of many in the industry that 
tire blowouts - instantaneous air losses - are caused primarily by inadequate air-pressure 
maintenance. 
All of the main tire manufacturers are developing the microchip technology (one 
reason details are not currently available). The system can be set to trigger an on-board 
warninglinformation to the driver or to use a drive-by system (while entering fuel islands 
in truck refueling areas, yards of fleets, etc.) that displays the pressureltemperature 
information externally. This technology will be commercially available and useable in the 
near future (almost definitely by the end of 2001). 
Regarding the control impacts of a front-tire blowout, Bridgestone believes the 
industry is doing whatever possible to prevent tire blowouts regardless of wheel location. 
In other words, there is no special effort that focuses on front-axle tire failures. 
During workshops that Bridgestone conducts, it demonstrates a fully loaded 
tractor-trailer at 80,000 lbs. driving over an object that causes the front tire to blow. If the 
driver employs the correct technique (accelerate), the driver can still maintain the rig 
within the lane boundaries when a front tire blowout occurs. 
Central tire inflation systems are a good idea, and they can serve as a soluition to 
compensate for miscellaneous shortcomings in tire-maintenance practices. They are, 
however, cost-prohibitive in most cases. 
Tire-Related Products 
Hutchinson 
Hutchinson's insert (see Figure 2) is called RunFlat (not to be confuse:d with 
Goodyear's). Other than for military vehicles, they are installed in many fire-fighting and 
rescue trucks. Another major application in the civilian world is monorails. The 
conditions and motivation are just right for this type of a system: a very smooth running 
track which allows the insert to be positioned very close to the tire's inside surface, so 
that the "drop" that occurs during a flat is minimal. At the same time, because of the 
accurate alignment, too large a drop can cause snags and costly repairs, The cost benefit 
in this case is deemed justified. 
Regarding heavy commercial truck applications, these trucks commonly use a 
drop-center tubeless wheel design with no "hump" to help set the tire bead against the 
rim's edge (see Figures 5 and 6). Instead, the surface of the rim is smooth, and even 
sloped towards the center. Installing RunFlat on such a rim will not be effective, as the 
tire will slide and "peel" off the wheel. In addition, the RunFlat ring has to be split into 
two halves to allow installation. Hutchinson makes heavy truck-size wheels that can work 
with the RunFlat device. They are successfully installed on General Motors heavy truck 
(commercial-type trucks used by the military) which are operating in Europe. 
Figure 5. Light-Truck Wheel with "humps" 
Figure 6. Smooth Truck Wheels 
Hutchinson makes another anti tire-failure system, which is a rubber filling of the 
whole tire cavity. The rubber has "bubbles" which serve as air-chambers to provide 
cushioning and spring action. However, the heat generated during high-speed, highway 
operation prevents the application of this system in heavy commercial trucks. (This also 
applies to polyurethane filling that tends to break down and deteriorate when heated). 
SmartTire 
This system uses wireless technology to monitor the air pressure and temperature 
in the tires. It consists of a display receiver mounted within sight and reach of the, driver 
and wheel sensors. 
One sensor is mounted on each wheel, and the tire is then mounted over the 
sensor enclosing the unit for protection from the elements. Each wheel sensor colntains: 
(1) a pressure transducer, (2) a temperature transducer, (3) a centrifugal switch, (4) a 
radio transmitter, (5) a unique ID code, and (6) a lithium battery. The interactive display 
module (see Figure 7) shows: (1) the required pressure, (2) the actual pressure, (3) the 
pressure status, and (4) the temperature. 
Figure 7. S~nartTire Concept 
Using two simple buttons, drivers can check the status of each tire. The sensors 
are activated with a centrifugal switch and transmit only when the vehicle is in rnotion. 
When the vehicle stops, the sensors return to sleep mode but the driver is still able to see 
the last signals sent while the vehicle was moving. Sleep mode extends the life of the 
lithium battery. 
Tyron Band 
The Tyron Band, seen in Figure 8. is fitted to the vehicle's wheel and converts the 
standard drop-center tubeless wheel to what they call a "safety wheel." Following tire 
deflation, the deflated tire is locked to the wheel (see figure) to provide the driver with 
better control. 
Figure 8. Tyson Band System 
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5. Summary Observations 
Summary of Crash Data Analyses (from Section 2) 
Crash files surveyed included the Trucks Involved in Fatal Accidents (TIFA) file, 
which is based on the Fatality Analysis Reporting System (FARS); the nationally- 
representative sample of police-reported crashes in the General Estimates System (GES) 
file; and state files from the states of Michigan, North Carolina, Texas, and Wash.ington. 
Analyzing these data produced the following findings: 
Tire defects are the second most common vehicle defect noted on trucks in fatal 
crashes, behind brakes. Nevertheless, coded tire defects are rare - 0.87 percent of 
trucks involved in a fatal crash are coded with a tire defect. 
Blowouts accounted for 40 percent of tire defects coded for trucks involved in a fatal 
crash. 
Blowouts occur in 0.35 percent of fatal truck crashes. There are 0.094 fatal truck 
crash involvements due to blowout per billion miles of truck travel. 
In fatal crashes involving blowout, 35 of 52 blowouts occurred on the front axle. The 
left steering tire suffered the blowout in 22 cases; the right steering tire in 13. 
Front axle blowouts in fatal truck crashes nearly always involved a loss of control. 
Drive and trailer axle blowouts usually do not lead to loss of control; in 9 of 12 such 
cases, the blowout did not directly cause the crash. 
Blowouts account for 0.25 percent of truck crash involvements of all severities. The 
rate of tire blowouts in all crashes, estimated from the GES data, is 1.695 blowout- 
related truck crashes per billion miles of truck travel. This rate compares with an 
overall truck crash rate of 671.16 truck crash involvements per billion miles of travel. 
Most (87.97 percent) blowout crashes are single-vehicle, except where a fatality is 
involved. In fatal crashes, 44.23 percent of tire blowout crashes involved only the 
truck. 
Between 1995 and 1997,62 persons were killed in truck tire blowout crashes and 663 
(+ 643, - large variance due to small sample size) were injured. Over the same 
period, 16,101 persons were fatally injured in a truck crash, and an estimated 357,000 
(+46,000) were injured. 
Of the state data files examined, only Washington state directly identifiled tire 
puncture as a vehicle defect. Between 1994 and 1996, 0.29 percent of truck crash 
involvements in Washington included a tire puncture. 
Crashes related to debris from truck tire blowouts in the roadway cannot be identified 
directly in any data, but using as a surrogate the more general category of object in 
the roadway, 0.16 percent of fatal crashes and 0.53 percent of all crashes are related 
to objects in the roadway. These percentages form the upper limit to the proportion of 
crashes caused by debris from tire blowouts. It is likely the true percentagie from 
blowouts alone is much lower. 
Summary of Information Review 
When compared to the magnitude and significance of today's trucking industry, 
and its rapid growth during the last few decades, the amount of literature related to truck 
tire blowouts is relatively small. Furthermore, very little crash analysis and 
corresponding data exist. Only six truck crashes investigated by the NTSB since 1972 
involved what they refer to as "tire failure." While it is understood that NTSB 
investigates only a limited numbers of crashes, the identification of just six tire failure 
crashes serves as another indicator that blowout-related crashes are quite infrequent. 
Relevant findings from the literature are: 
Most of the documented research on this subject was performed between the 1960s 
and the 1980s. 
Tire-failure crashes are very rare. 
Based on a 1976 study [ 2 ] ,  BMCS data (1973) shows front tire failure crashes to 
have a higher fatality rate and property damage costs than for all truck crashes. 
The availability of crash-site data is limited, and tires are often wrongfully cited as 
the cause of the crash. 
When a tire blowout results in a crash, it usually involves a front-axle tire. 
A front-tire blowout significantly degrades the directional control of the vehicle. 
Maintenance issues (e.g., under-inflation, overloading, tire mismatching, excessive 
wear, inadequate inspections, and associated matters leading to increased heat and 
tire operating temperatures) are the major causes of tire blowout. 
Road hazards are another contributing factor causing tire blowout. 
Testing of devices aimed at minimizing the negative effect of blowout on directional 
control showed that some have the potential for improving a truck's post-blowout 
stability. 
Summary of New Tire Technology Developments 
The information pertaining to development and application of tire technology 
reviewed under this work included traditional library printed media (journals, reports, 
news articles, professional magazines), electronic and internet media (websites of 
manufacturers, suppliers, and organizations, online press releases), telephone interviews, 
personal meetings with industry and trade association personnel, and observing 
demonstrations of technology. The main findings are as follows: 
The surveyed industry views inadequate maintenance as the primary cause for tire 
blowout. 
Attempts to solve the problem are best accomplished by addressing the source. 
Signikant  effort goes into helping fleets develop proper maintenance procedures 
and driver education. 
The common view in the tire-manufacturing industry is that a properly maintained 
tire blows only upon impacting road hazards. Further, an alert and well-trained 
driver will not lose control of the rig when a front tire blows. 
Potential devices aimed at the blowout problem are: 
1. Central inflationlmonitoring system - the most promising and accepted method 
in terms of cost-benefit and applicability. 
2. Integral monitoring by computer chip technology - under development by all 
major manufacturers with very high expectations as to the positive impact .it will 
have on maintenance and. in-service tire failures. 
3 .  Add-on monitoring by special on-the-wheel devices - often used in 
combination with a central-inflation system, but more limited since it cannot 
actively intervene and correct for improper inflation levels. 
4. Supporting inserts - potentially helpful but currently used only in military and 
security applications on heavy vehicles. It may begin to penetrate the "civilian" 
markets of passenger cars and light trucks over time. 
5. Tire filling (e.g., with some rubber substance) - not applicable for hig;hway 
trucks due to heat build-up. 
Retreads are very widely used, primarily on non-steering, rear axle locations. 
Retread manufacturing processes do not appear to contribute significantly to tire 
blowouts. 
The military experiences more blowout failures than do commercial fleets, prirnarily 
due to the nature of its operation. Central inflationlmonitoring systems are used on 
many military tactical vehicles. 
TACOM and a commercial partner are developing an inspection system based upon 
an infrared thermal imaging technology. The objective is to detect tire defects that 
can lead to tire failure. 
Front-tire blowouts are not viewed by carrier fleets as a significant issue. 
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Appendix A. - Example Computer Simulation of a 
Front Tire Blowout on a Loaded Triples combination. 
This appendix material provides an example calculation produced by an UMTRI 
computer model for a loaded triples combination vehicle experiencing an assumed tire 
blowout on the front steer axle of the tractor. Separate calculations were performed for 
both left front and right front tire blowout cases. Key assumptions in this example ;are: 
the vehicle (10-ft wheelbase tractor pulling three loaded 27-ft trailers) is 
initially travelling in a straight line at 55 mph 
the tire blowout results in a steady drag force on the blown tire of 0.4 x (tire 
load) (i.e., a friction drag of 0.4 at the blowout tire location) 
the driver ideally responds in 0.25 seconds after the blowout event with 
continuous corrective (counter) steering behavior to bring the vehicle back into 
its initial travel lane 
the driver takes another 1.5 seconds to fully adapt to the loss of one front tire 
and increase steering gain accordingly to compensate for the tire blowout (i.e., 
more corrective steering effort/magnitude is required to steer a tractor having 
only one front tire available) 
Using these basic assumptions for the triples combination vehicle (and this would 
apply similarly to loaded tractor-semitrailer configurations with comparable short 
wheelbase tractors), the model indicates a significant lateral excursion of the vehicle 
towards the blowout-side of the vehicle. That is, a left-side blowout produces a leftward 
path motion of the vehicle, and vice versa. The primary physical mechanism for this 
response is the applied yaw moment on the tractor due to the wheel drag force after the 
blowout, thereby causing the tractor to turn toward the direction of the blown tire. 
Differences exist between left- and right-side blowout cases. Left-side blowouts 
result in slightly more severe path disturbances. This is primarily due to the nature of the 
tractor steering system and the fact that the right-front wheel is steered by a track rod 
connected to the left-front wheel, which in turn, is steered more directly by the driver 
through the gearbox connection. When a left-front blowout occurs, the initial torque 
impulse to the steering system can pulse the right side tire, causing an initial steering 
pulse from the right-side tire that contributes to a leftward movement of the tractor. For 
right-side blowouts, a similar (but opposite polarity) initial steering torque impulse is 
transmitted to the left-side tire, but because of its additional connection restraint to the 
gearbox, a smaller echo steer impulse is produced at the left tire in this case. The 
asymmetry in these initial steering system pulse responses produce corresponding 
asymmetries in initial tractor yaw rate responses that then become manifest as subsequent 
asymmetric path displacements. In this particular example calculation, peak lateral path 
excursions by the vehicle following left-side blowouts are seen to be about 30% or so 
larger than for right-side blowouts under comparable conditions. 
For the above assumptions, a left-side blowout produces about a 5-foot peak 
excursion to the left prior to recovery by the simulated driver; a right-side blowout under 
identical conditions produces about a 3.5-foot peak displacement. The two attached 
figures show a simple animation sequence for each case. The frames in the animation 
sequence are at 1 second intervals and the blowout event occurs just prior to the second 
frame. 
For cases in which a driver is assumed to be very alert and reacts almost 
immediately to the blowout (i.e., the driver steering response and the blowout recognition 
delays noted above in the assumptions are both 0.25 seconds), the peak lateral path 
excursions noted above are shown to be reduced by about one-third. 
The model also indicates that tractors having longer wheelbases suffer smaller 
lateral path disturbances than shorter wheelbase tractors. This is reasonable since longer 
wheelbase tractors are heavier and possess larger yaw moments of inertia that help resist 
external disturbances. Longer wheelbase tractors also provide a longer moment arm over 
which corrective steering control inputs by the driver (i.e., the lateral tire force from steer 
inputs) can act to help arrest the disturbance moment on the tractor caused by a front tire 
blowout. 
Smaller or larger friction value assumptions for post-blowout wheellroad contact 
will reduce or increase the lateral motion responses accordingly. The example 
calculation used here corresponds to value of 0.4 at the blown tire location. 
Driver reaction and compensatory steering behavior also plays an important role 
in affecting peak lateral displacement of the vehicle during a post-blowout recovery. The 
driver behavior in this example is idealized in the sense that driver corrective steering 
reaction occurs within 0.25 seconds and is further improved 1.5 seconds later by 
additional steering gain corrections (driver adaptation) that account for the loss of 
available lateral tire force from the blown tire. For cases in which a driver is not 
particularly attentive and adapts more slowly to the blowout disturbance and its steering 
control requirement, significantly larger lateral path motions would be expected. 
T'ire 13lowo~.rt Exarliple 




Tire Blowout Example 
Triples @ 55 mph 
End 
